Are Individuals Luck Egalitarians? – An Experiment on the Influence of Brute and Option Luck on Social Preferences by Gustav Tinghög et al.
fpsyg-08-00460 March 27, 2017 Time: 13:53 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 29 March 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00460
Edited by:
Narayanan Srinivasan,
Allahabad University, India
Reviewed by:
Pablo Brañas-Garza,
Middlesex University, UK
Antonio M. Espín,
Middlesex University, UK
*Correspondence:
Gustav Tinghög
gustav.tinghog@liu.se
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 19 October 2016
Accepted: 13 March 2017
Published: 29 March 2017
Citation:
Tinghög G, Andersson D and
Västfjäll D (2017) Are Individuals Luck
Egalitarians? – An Experiment on
the Influence of Brute and Option
Luck on Social Preferences.
Front. Psychol. 8:460.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00460
Are Individuals Luck Egalitarians? –
An Experiment on the Influence of
Brute and Option Luck on Social
Preferences
Gustav Tinghög1,2*, David Andersson1 and Daniel Västfjäll1,3
1 JEDILab, Division of Economics, Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden,
2 Department of Medical and Health Sciences, The National Center for Priority Setting in Health Care, Linköping University,
Linköping, Sweden, 3 Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA
According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities should be deemed fair as long as they
follow from individuals’ deliberate and fully informed choices (i.e., option luck) while
inequalities should be deemed unfair if they follow from choices over which the individual
has no control (i.e., brute luck). This study investigates if individuals’ fairness preferences
correspond with the luck egalitarian fairness position. More specifically, in a laboratory
experiment we test how individuals choose to redistribute gains and losses that stem
from option luck compared to brute luck. A two-stage experimental design with real
incentives was employed. We show that individuals (n = 226) change their action
associated with re-allocation depending on the underlying conception of luck. Subjects
in the brute luck treatment equalized outcomes to larger extent (p = 0.0069). Thus,
subjects redistributed a larger amount to unlucky losers and a smaller amount to lucky
winners compared to equivalent choices made in the option luck treatment. The effect is
less pronounced when conducting the experiment with third-party dictators, indicating
that there is some self-serving bias at play. We conclude that people have fairness
preference not just for outcomes, but also for how those outcomes are reached. Our
findings are potentially important for understanding the role citizens assign individual
responsibility for life outcomes, i.e., health and wealth.
Keywords: fairness, luck egalitarianism, brute luck, option luck, strategy method dictator game, laboratory
experiment
INTRODUCTION
How to deal fairly with the burdens and benefits that follow from individuals’ fortune and
misfortune has long been a prominent topic in philosophy (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981; Levy,
2011). This discussion is also closely linked with policy issues such as; when should individuals
be held financially responsible for their own ill health? to what extent should society level out the
inequalities in financial wealth? This paper seeks to investigate how different types of luck influence
social preferences in a behavioral experiment.
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Brute and Option Luck
It is evident that aspects of luck significantly affect outcomes in
many spheres of life. The genes that we are equipped with at birth
are highly influential in determining the extent to which we will
be able to live a long and healthy life. The social environment
that we are born into heavily influences our future wealth, etc.
Such outcomes can be ascribed to brute luck, i.e., how risks
fall out that are not in the sense deliberate choices. However,
not all of life’s outcomes are simply due to such unforeseeable
brute luck. In fact, most choices that we make involve deliberate
risk-taking, e.g., buying a lottery ticket, biking in traffic, and
smoking cigarettes. The outcomes associated with such choices
are a matter of how deliberate choices that involve risk-taking
turn out – whether or not our option luck is good or bad. The
extent to which society should seek to eliminate inequalities that
are due to these two different types of luck is a recurrent topic
in philosophy and public policy. However, to our knowledge,
no experiment has investigated the extent to which individuals’
fairness preferences about inequalities change due to different
types of luck.
The distinction between brute luck and option luck was first
introduced by Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin, 1981), who stated that:
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles
turn out – whether someone gains or loses through accepting an
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have
declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not
in the sense deliberate gambles. (Dworkin, 1981, p. 293). If I buy
a stock on the exchange that rises, then my option luck is good. If
I am hit by a falling meteorite whose course could not have been
predicted, then my bad luck is brute (even though I could have
moved just before it struck if I had had any reason to know where
it would strike) (Dworkin, 1981, p. 73).
The concept of brute luck and option luck later became closely
associated with what is sometimes labeled as luck egalitarianism
(Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989). The standard formulation of this
doctrine is that a person should not be worse off than anyone
else, in respect to some metric or currency of goods, as a result
of brute luck. Thus, inequalities for which individuals have had
no possibility to influence through their own choices should be
deemed unfair and therefore equalized, while inequalities that
follow from individuals’ deliberate and fully informed choices
should be deemed fair. The traditional distinction between
inequity and inequality is intimately linked to the notion of
brute and option luck. There could be equity in an unequal
distribution if inequalities arise from option luck, but when
an unequal distribution arises from brute luck inequality and
inequity coincides.
Previous Experiments
Behavioral experiments have consistently established that
individuals care not only about their own material payoff, but
they also care about other-regarding aspects (Forsythe et al.,
1994; Andreoni et al., 2003; Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). The
dictator game1 is a workhorse for studying fairness preferences
1The game typically involves two players; a dictator and a receiver. The anonymous
dictator makes an initial choice on how to allocate (split) some endowment and
in experiments since it involves no strategic concerns related to
behavior. The first dictator game with real stakes was conducted
by Forsythe et al. (1994) who found that around 60% of
participants shared a positive amount of money, with the mean
transfer at roughly 20% of the endowment. These findings of
the standard dictator game have since been replicated numerous
times and appear to be fairly robust also across cultures (Henrich
et al., 2001). The growth of this empirical literature2 has fueled
theoretical advances in economic models that aim to explain
observed non-selfish behavior. The inequity-aversion models
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
have been established as the paramount theoretical models to
explain so-called social preferences in dictator games (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). These models
focus on individuals’ relative position to explain non-selfish
behavior. Another category of fairness models assigns a major
behavioral role to reciprocity, i.e., intentions (e.g., Rabin, 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
However, both the inequity-aversion and reciprocity models
have maintained a consequentialist perspective, focusing on
distributive fairness concerns while largely neglecting the fact
that individuals also have preferences regarding how these
outcomes are reached – procedural fairness concerns3.
Most experimental studies that have investigated individuals’
concerns for procedural fairness have been designed to examine
how effort and ability influence distributive choices. This is
typically done in a two-person bargaining game by assigning
a proposer based on some form of unrelated ability or effort
measure (e.g., a hash-mark game or a word-search task). The
assigned responder then gets to allocate an initial entitlement
between himself/herself and a respondent who may accept or
decline this offer. The general conclusion from these studies
is that most people consider distributive inequalities as fair
as long as they stem from differences in effort or ability
(Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Burrows and Loomes, 1994; Konow,
2000; Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010, 2014).
Similarly, Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012) show that
individuals in a dictator game typically endorse a biased ideal
of fairness and employ justice principles in a self-serving way to
maximize their own payoff.
Although the influence of effort and ability on fairness
preferences, have received considerable attention, less attention
has been devoted to different aspects of luck and how it influences
fairness preferences in behavioral experiment. At the macro
level, a strong correlation between how much a country spends
on social programs and its citizens’ beliefs about whether luck
or effort determines wealth has been established (Fong, 2001;
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009). The
two studies that come closets to the behavioral experiment we
the anonymous receiver passively receives the remainder of the endowment. The
strategy for a person motivated purely by material self-interest would be to keep
the entire endowment and leave the receiver with nothing.
2At the time of writing this article, the empirical literature on dictator games
comprises more than 129 published articles; see Engel (2011) for a meta-study.
3We here define procedural fairness broadly; as concerns how the distribution
of individuals’ prospects or opportunities should be allowed to causally influence
material outcomes.
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present here are the studies by Möllerström et al. (2015) and
Cappelen et al. (2013).
Cappelen et al. (2013) employed a two-stage experiment
to study fairness views about risk-taking. The first phase
involved participants making a sequence of choices between
risky and safe alternatives in a gambling situation. In the second
phase, participants were paired and the earnings of each pair
were pooled. Participants were informed about the choices
and outcome of the risk-taking phase for both parties and
were asked to distribute total earnings. Cappelen et al. (2013)
concluded that most participants in their sample endorsed ex
post redistribution between lucky and unlucky risk takers, but
not between risk-takers and participants who avoided risk and
chose a safe alternative. They label this fairness position choice
egalitarianism. Although choice egalitarianism is closely related
to luck egalitarianism, the design employed by Cappelen et al.
(2013) did not allow for the essential comparisons between
different types of luck and how this influences individuals’
preferences for redistribution. To do this, it is necessary to
incorporate aspects of voluntary and involuntary risk-taking.
Möllerström et al. (2015) also employed a two-stage
experiment in which third-party spectators redistributed
resources between agents who could partly insure themselves
against unfavorable outcomes. Each spectator decided whether
to leave earnings unchanged or equalize them in 11 potential
scenarios involving the same agents. Thus, there was a joint
precence of uncontrollable and controllable events that
spectators had to consider when making redistributive decisions.
Möllerström et al. (2015) found that spectators were more willing
to redistribute money when bad brute luck was causing the
outcome. However, they also found that spectators condition
compensation for bad brute luck on agents’ irrelevant choices
about option luck exposure. Thus, they conclude that people
are more accurately described as “choice compensators” than
luck egalitarians. For example, choice compensators would hold
smokers more responsible for poor health than non-smokers
regardless of whether the disease is caused by smoking or not.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent
to which individuals’ preferences for redistribution correspond
with the luck egalitarian fairness position in situations which
separately involve brute and option luck. The primary hypothesis,
which we set out to test, is:
Hypothesis: Individuals equalize inequalities resulting from
brute luck to a greater extent compared to inequalities resulting
from option luck.
In addition to the stated hypothesis, which follows directly
from luck egalitarianism and primarily focus on different types
of bad luck, we also set out to investigate if different types of good
luck influence individuals’ preferences for redistribution. This
matter is less frequently discussed. However, if individuals choose
to redistribute less money to individuals who suffer bad option
luck it would be analogous if individuals were also more willing
to redistribute money to individuals who enjoy good option
luck, given that these are also outcomes from deliberate choices.
Also, in capitalist market economies, taking economic risks is an
essential part of the role of entrepreneurs. Hence, we also want to
investigate if individuals reward successful, deliberate risk-taking.
Finally, we set out to investigate if fairness views related to
luck is dependent on individuals being involved in the actual
experiment. Previous studies have proposed that differences
in stakeholder-view make little difference for individuals when
making fairness judgment (Konow, 2000, 2009). However
empirical evidence on this matter remains scarce. By comparing
the fairness behavior between third-party dictators and dictators
actively taking part in the decision-making phase, we aim to
examine the extent to which fairness views of stakeholders deviate
from impartial spectators with regards to brute and option luck.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
Section “Materials and Methods” describes the basic design of
the experiments and the data collection procedure. The Section
“Result” presents the results from our experiment. The Section
“Discussion” discusses policy implications and potential caveats
associated with our experimental design.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Two separate experiments to investigate how different types
of luck influence social preferences were conducted. These
experiments were identical except that Experiment 1 relied
on fairness judgments made by participants with personal
stake related to the outcome of the luck-related task, while
Experiment 2 included third-party participants to make the
equivalent fairness judgment. Both experiments involved self-
selected students as participants. Although worries about the
external validity of such a subject pool could be raised, studies
by for example Exadaktylos et al. (2013) have shown that self-
selected students are an appropriate subject pool for the study of
social behavior.
Experiment 1
Participants were recruited among students at the Department
of Management and Engineering at Linköping University. In
total, 126 subjects (49% Females; Mean age 22) participated
in 16 experimental sessions that lasted approximately 20 min.
No one participated more than once, and individuals with
prior knowledge about the experiment were excluded from the
experiment. Prior to the experiment, subjects were randomly
assigned to either option luck or brute luck treatment. We ran
equal numbers of brute and option luck experiment sessions
on a given day. Every second session was either option or
brute luck treatment. Subjects were allowed to specify if there
were any particular times when they were unable to participate.
No information concerning payment for participating in the
experiment was given beforehand. The experiment was single
blind, i.e., the participant could not associate any decisions
with particular subjects, but one experimenter oversaw the
decisions in order to arrange payments. Payments were
made in cash in a marked envelope at the end of the
experiment.
Before each experimental session, we randomly paired two
individuals and assigned them to a role of either dictator or
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recipient in the dictator game. Hence, we employed a random
dictator rule where each person had an equal chance of dictating
the result, and strategic considerations were eliminated. All
instructions were presented in written form. Subjects were
asked not to talk to other participants during the experiment,
but were encouraged to raise questions to the experiment
leader if anything was unclear. For complete instructions see
Supplementary Material.
The experiment was divided into three phases; the initial
treatment phase where subjects were presented with instructions
associated with either option or brute luck, the allocation phase
where subjects made allocation decisions before the actual
outcome of the experiment was disclosed, and the final outcome
phase where a coin toss was used to separate lucky winners and
unlucky losers.
At the outset of the experiment, subjects in the option
luck treatment were given a two-option choice for how they
would be compensated. If subjects chose the safe option, they
received 50 SEK for participating in the experiment. If they
chose the risky option a coin toss (executed by the experiment
leader) would settle if the subject would receive 150 SEK
or 0 SEK for participating in the experiment. Hence, the
expected value of the risky option was 75 SEK. Given that the
expected payoff was 50% higher if choosing the risky option,
it would arguably be perceived as the “right” choice. At the
outset of the experiment, subjects in the brute luck treatment
were told that their compensation would be settled through a
coin toss (150 SEK or 0 SEK) at the end of the experiment.
Hence, the expected value associated with participating was
75 SEK.
In the strategy phase, subjects were informed that they were
anonymously and randomly paired with another participant,
and that one participant in each pair would randomly be
awarded an additional 100 SEK. The subject was asked to specify
how he/she would distribute these additional 100 SEK between
himself/herself and the anonymous partner by means of the
strategy method, i.e., subjects were asked to specify their actions
for every possible scenario (presented in the same order) in
the experiment prior to knowing the outcome of the coin toss.
This allowed us to collect data on a subject’s complete strategy.
In the brute luck treatment, the two potential scenarios were
that the subject was paired with a winner (150 SEK) or a
loser (0 SEK). Subjects in the option luck treatment faced the
same potential scenarios, but in addition they were also asked
to specify how they would distribute 100 SEK in a scenario
where they were paired with someone who had chosen the
safe alternative (50 SEK) in the initial treatment phase. Given
that this was a one-shot experiment, subjects did not have to
consider how their distribution could potentially affect future
outcomes.
When everyone had specified their dictator strategies, these
were collected and a coin toss was used to separate lucky winners
from unlucky losers. The experimenter publicly executed the coin
toss. Once this was done, the subjects were asked to fill out an
unrelated questionnaire while one of the experimenters went to a
separate room to arrange envelopes with correct payment, based
on the strategies revealed.
Experiment 2
The procedure and methods used in Experiment 2 followed
the same structure as in Experiment 1. The only difference in
design between Experiments 1 and 2 concerned the inclusion of
third-party dictators to make the allocation decision. Thus, the
allocation phase in experiment 2 was conducted with impartial
subjects who did not themselves participate in the actual task
involving different types of luck. In total, 2004 subjects (37%
Females; Mean age 22) participated in four sessions that lasted
approximately 15 min.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four possible
roles; Brute Luck Receiver; Option Luck Receiver; Brute Luck
Dictator, Option Luck Dictator. Participants with respective roles
conducted the experiment in separate rooms. Dictators were
randomly paired with a receiver from their respective treatment.
Dictators received 50 SEK as a show-up fee and did the same
unrelated fill-in task as all other participants in the experiment.
Finally, dictators were asked to split 100 SEK between themselves
and their randomly assigned partner according to the same
strategy method used in Experiment 1.
Analysis
To test our hypothesis with regard to the difference in
redistribution rates between the brute luck and the option luck
treatments, an unpaired two-sample t-test was conducted. To test
differences with regard to the difference in redistribution rates
between gamblers and non-gamblers in the option luck treatment
a paired two-sample t-test was conducted. The results from the
t-tests were confirmed via a non-parametric bootstrap analysis.
Ethics Statement
We consulted the ethical review board for East Sweden to
determine whether a formal approval of the committee was
required. It was concluded that a formal assessment by the Ethics
Committee was not necessary because the participants were
given fulldisclosure of the procedure (i.e., there was no deceit),
participants received a payment proportionate to the task at hand,
the experimental procedure was noninvasive and the results
were analyzed anonymously. Furthermore, the participants in all
experiments were recruited online through our JEDILab subject
pool and voluntarily subscribed for participation in the described
experiments. They were informed participation was voluntary
and anonymous.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive results from Experiments 1 and 2.
The pooled results clearly show that procedural justice concerns
related to option and brute luck influence an individual’s
preferences for redistribution. On average subjects in the brute
luck treatment gave more to unlucky losers than to lucky winners
(on average 24.2 SEK more). Subjects in the option luck treatment
gave only 12.5 SEK more to unlucky losers compared to lucky
4Hundred subjects participated as receivers only in the specially designed version
of the dictator game.
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TABLE 1 | Redistribution in the dictator game for option and brute luck.
Brute luck (mean SEK
Sent by dictators)
Option luck (mean SEK
sent by dictators)
Difference (Brute
luck-Option luck)
P-value
t-test
P-value
Mann–Whitney
Experiment 1
Unlucky losers (0 SEK) 47.0 38.1 8.9 0.0733 0.2229
Lucky winners (150 SEK) 21.6 27.3 –5.6 0.2533 0.1449
Difference (losers-winners) 25.3 10.8 14.5 0.0191 0.0349
Experiment 2 with third-party dictators
Unlucky losers (0 SEK) 36.3 33.6 2.8 0.5983 0.8681
Lucky winners (150 SEK) 13.7 19.1 –5.4 0.2810 0.1071
Difference (losers-winners) 22.7 14.5 8.2 0.1718 0.1170
Pooled
Unlucky losers (0 SEK) 42.4 36.1 6.30 0.0839 0.3061
Lucky winners (150 SEK) 18.2 23.6 –5.4 0.1268 0.0378
Difference (losers-winners) 24.2 12.5 11.70 0.0069 0.0089
FIGURE 1 | Distribution of responses for the difference in redistribution between losers and winners in each experimental treatment.
winners. This difference between experimental treatments in
how subjects redistributed money was statistically significant
[t(223) = 2.73, p = 0.0069]. As shown in Figure 1 this difference
was mainly due to the higher share (64.3% vs. 46.0%) of subjects
in the option luck treatment who made no difference in amount
redistributed for losers and winners.
As shown in Table 1, the average redistribution rates that
subjects chose for participants who lost the coin toss (unlucky
losers) was higher in the brute luck treatment (42%) compared
to the option luck treatment (36%), suggesting stronger social
preferences for individuals who suffer bad brute luck compared
to bad option luck [t(223) = 1.73, p = 0.0839]. This result
is in line with our hypothesis that individuals redistribute a
larger share of their own endowment to individuals who have
suffered bad brute luck compared to bad option luck. Table 1 also
shows that participants redistribute higher amounts to winners
of the coin toss (lucky winners) in the option luck treatment
(24%) compared to the brute luck treatment (18%). Albeit
not significant, this result suggests that outcomes due to good
option luck are deemed to be fairer than outcomes due to good
brute luck. When using a non-parametric test (Mann–Whitney),
however, the result for lucky winners is significant (z = –2.08,
p = 0.0378) while the result for unlucky losers is no longer
significant at the 10%-level (z = 1.02, p= 0.3061).
Looking at the results from Experiment 2 alone we see
that the difference between treatments are no longer significant
[t(97)= 1.38, p= 0.1718]. However, a further interaction analysis
showed that the difference in the effect of treatment did not
significantly differ between the experiments (see Table A1–A3
in Supplementary Materials). All effect signs in Experiment 2
go in the same direction as in Experiment 1, indicating that
stakeholders and spectators in general act on the same fairness
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views. In addition we also see that third-party dictators in general
give significantly less to both losers [t(223) = 2.10, p = 0.0368]
and winners [t(223)= 2.27, p= 0.0242] compared to dictators in
Experiment 1. Thus, third-party dictators show weaker altruistic
preferences.
Table 2 shows that subjects in Experiment 1 chose to
redistribute significantly less to risk averse non-gambling
individuals compared to both unlucky losers and lucky winners.
Consequently, non-gamblers were punished by participants as a
consequence of their cautious behavior5. These findings are in
line with the findings from Cappelen et al. (2013) who found
that people equalized earnings significantly less in distributive
situations in which risk takers were paired with participants
choosing a safe option. In Experiment 2 we see the same
effect when comparing risk averse individuals with unlucky
losers. However, for lucky winners the effect surprisingly goes
in the opposite direction (albeit not significant) compared to
Experiment 1, i.e., third-party dictators give more to non-
gamblers than lucky winners.
DISCUSSION
Which inequalities among individuals should be considered
unjust and therefore equalized? The doctrine of luck
egalitarianism proposes that when individuals are worse off
than others because of bad brute luck, they should have a claim to
compensation, whereas if their disadvantage can be traced back
to specific choices they made deliberately, then the inequality
appears justified. To many solidarity reaches its limit when
neediness is self-inflicted. However, our results show that this
is true also for risky behavior. Individuals do not only judge
the same outcome distribution differently, but change their
action associated with re-allocation depending on the underlying
conception of luck. This study provides better understanding for
how individuals evaluate social outcomes where luck has been at
play, but where factors of merit/effort and entitlement have been
excluded.
5It should be noted that the risky option had a higher expected value and that this is
likely to have influenced the result. For future research, it would thus be interesting
to explore similar situations where expected value are identical for risky and safe
options.
TABLE 2 | Redistribution to risk averse subjects (i.e., non-gamblers)
compared to risk takers in the option luck treatment.
Value Diff P-value
Experiment 1
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Unlucky losers 18.4–38.1 –19.7 <0.0001
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Lucky winners 18.4–27.3 –8.9 0.0245
Experiment 2
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Unlucky losers 24.6–33.6 –9.0 0.0059
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Lucky winners 24.6–19.1 5.6 0.1009
Experiments 1 and 2 (Pooled)
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Unlucky losers 21.2–36.0 –14.9 <0.0001
Risk averse (non-gamblers) – Lucky winners 21.2–23.6 –2.4 0.3644
From a general point of view, the results from this experiment
are in line with previous studies, which suggested that process-
related fairness plays an important role when forming social
preferences, e.g., (Frohlich et al., 1987; Bolton et al., 2005;
Cappelen et al., 2007). In this respect our results also cast serious
doubt on the consequentialistic practice inherent in standard
economic theory that focuses solely on utility related to outcomes
while neglecting the underlying process.
From a more specific point of view, the findings from this
experiment demonstrate that individuals change their behavior
depending on the type of luck underlying inequalities. Moreover,
we see a behavioral pattern that redistribution is higher when
inequalities are due to brute luck. This suggests that the general
luck egalitarian fairness view is not just a philosophic endeavor,
but also a theory that is in accordance with the fairness judgments
made by a non-negligible fraction of the population in our
sample.
Our main hypothesis focused on inequalities due to
bad luck, suggesting that individuals have stronger social
preferences toward individuals who have suffered bad brute
luck compared to bad option luck. The results show higher
redistribution among individuals randomly assigned to the brute
luck treatment, suggesting stronger other-regarding preferences
toward individuals who suffer bad brute luck compared to bad
option luck in our study sample.
Our analysis relates to the study by Cappelen et al. (2013)
who investigated the impact of risk-taking on social preferences.
However, Cappelen et al. (2013) investigated social preferences
in a context of ex ante equality in opportunities, but ex post
inequalities in earnings. By imposing an exogenous shift between
option and brute luck, the design of this study allows us to take
the opposite approach and investigate social preferences in a
context of ex ante inequality in opportunities and equality in ex
post earnings. The findings by Cappelen et al. (2013) show that
inequalities between lucky and unlucky risk takers are deemed
more acceptable than inequalities between risk takers and people
choosing the safe alternative – a finding that is in line with what
we find in our option luck treatment.
Although observed patterns with regards to other-regarding
preferences are similar in Experiments 1 and 2, it should
be noted that fairness preferences are less strongly in line
with luck egalitarianism in Experiment 2 where we employ
third-party dictators. However, a further interaction analysis
showed that the difference in the effect of treatment did not
significantly differ between the experiments. Interestingly we also
find that third-party dictators show less altruistic preferences
when redistributing money in the dictator game compared to
dictators who make identical decisions from a stakeholder view.
This finding is robust across experimental treatments and goes
against previous studies by Konow (2000, 2009) and Cappelen
et al. (2013) who have argued that differences in stakeholder-
view make little difference for individuals when making fairness
judgments.
As stated at the outset of this paper, the issues we address
are in essence normative. Still, empirical insight concerning
how individuals’ social preferences for inequalities are formed
and influenced is key for understanding the formation and
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sustainability of any welfare system. If policies that seek to level
inequalities that most individuals think are fair is implemented,
it could potentially erode the feeling of solidarity necessary for
a well functioning welfare system. Hence, the findings from this
study are relevant for understanding a wide range of public
choices where aspects of luck are in play, e.g., public bailouts
in situations of financial crisis and financial redistribution for
different types of income.
The other side of the influence of luck is, of course,
responsibility. To what extent should individuals be held
responsible for favorable/unfavorable outcomes? For luck
egalitarians the response is that any outcome not derived from
brute luck should be attributed to individual responsibility.
However, in real life it is not easy to make a clear distinction
between brute and option luck. Much of the political discourse
on funding for health care has centered on the role of individual
responsibility in healthcare financing (Buyx, 2008; Tinghög et al.,
2010). Is a cancer patient with a history of heavy smoking less
entitled to public insurance compared to a non-smoking cancer
patient? The results from our experiment by no means settle
complicated questions like these. But the experiment provides
empirical background, which could feed the normative debate.
Our study might, however, shed some light on why there seems to
be an increasing trend toward assigning individual responsibility
an explicit role in public policy. Obviously, luck egalitarian
thinking underlies the taxation of risky activities that could
potentially lead to outcomes costly for society, e.g., use of tobacco,
alcohol, and unhealthy food. Moreover, insurance policies in
principle a structured arrangement where the lucky compensate
the unlucky.
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